

Message Text

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PAGE 01 LOUREN 00422 01 OF 03 031829Z

67

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FM AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2595

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AMCONSUL LUANDA

AMEMBASSY BLANTYRE

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY MBABANE

AMEMBASSY GABORONE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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AMEMBASSY DAKAR

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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 LOURENCO MARQUES 0422

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PFOR, PDEV, MZ

SUBJECT: SPECULATIVE COMMENT ON WHAT IS TO COME IN MOZAMBIQUE

FROM VAN OSS

1. SUMMARY: WHILE DETAILS OF TIMING AND PROCEDURE ARE STILL

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PAGE 02 LOUREN 00422 01 OF 03 031829Z

TO BE WORKED OUT, MOZAMBIQUE WILL BE INDEPENDENT WITHIN TWO

YEARS UNDER BLACK GOVERNMENT. DESPITE SOME QUESTION AS TO EXTENT OF ITS PRESENT SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, FRELIMO WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY DOMINATE THE REGIME. THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES AT FIRST ARE LIKELY FOLLOW AFRICAN SOCIALIST RATHER THAN DEMOCRATIC LINES, PERHAPS MODELED ON TANZANIA. THE U.S. HAS NOTHING TO BE ASHAMED OF IN ITS PAST POLICIES TOWARDS PORTUGAL AND PORTUGUESE TERRITORIES, AND SHOULD NOW GIVE MOZAMBIQUE THE SAME CONSIDERATION AS IT HAS GIVEN OTHER COUNTRIES IN COMPARABLE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO CROWN MY TOUR IN LOURENCO MARQUES WITH COMPREHENSIVE THINK-PIECE BASED ON RICH EXPERIENCE OF PAST THREE YEARS. HOWEVER, FAST-MOVING AND FAR-REACHING CHANGES SINCE OVERTHROW OF CAETANO REGIME IN PORTUGAL HAVE MADE PREDICTIONS, ESTIMATES AND ANALYSES WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTED MONTH AGO, IRRELEVANT TODAY. HENCE, I SHALL RESTRICT MYSELF TO HASTY COMMENT ON HOW THINGS LOOK AT THIS MOMENT, SOME HESITANT SPECULATION ON WHAT SEEMS LIKELY TO HAPPEN, AND BRIEF SUGGESTION ON HOW THE U.S. SHOULD REACT.

3. CERTAIN PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS SEEM PERTINENT:

A) SPINOLA'S BOOK, "PORTUGAL AND THE FUTURE" CAN NO LONGER BE REGARDED AS A REFUGE FOR THOSE WHO ARE STILL HOPING FOR GRADUAL (AS OPPOSED TO SWIFT) CHANGES IN STATUS OF PORTUGUESE AFRICAN TERRITORIES.

B) WHILE IT WOULD PROBABLY BE BEST FOR MOZAMBIQUE IF FULL INDEPENDENCE WERE TO BE ACHIEVED DELIBERATELY WITH ADEQUATE PREPARATION AND GRADUAL PHASE-OUT OF PORTUGUESE RULE OVER PERIOD OF, SAY, THREE TO FIVE YEARS, INDEPENDENCE WILL PROBABLY COME WELL WITHIN TWO YEARS, PERHAPS WITHIN ONE, AND MOZAMBIQUE WILL BE RULED BY BLACK LEADERS.

C) AFTER TEN YEARS OF ARMED STRUGGLE WITH VERY LITTLE CONCRETE GAIN TO SHOW FOR IT(EXCEPT IN REALM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE), FRELIMO IS ABOUT TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PORTUGUESE AND APPEARS ON VERGE OF GETTING VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING IT WANTS, WITH TIMING AND METHOD OF ACQUIRING INDEPENDENCE (AND GUARANTEES FOR WHITE MINORITY) THE MAIN QUESTIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED.

D) REGARDLESS OF BRAVE ASSERTIONS BY JUNTA VICE PRESIDENT GENERAL COSTA GOMES AND OTHERS, TO EFFECT THAT PORTUGUESE

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PAGE 03 LOUREN 00422 01 OF 03 031829Z

ARMED FORCES WILL CARRY ON AND IF NECESSARY INTENSIFY THE MILITARY STRUGGLE IF FRELIMO DOES NOT ACCEPT PRESENT OFFER TO DISCONTINUE HOSTILITIES AND SEEK POWER THROUGH PEACEFUL POLITICAL ACTION, IT SEEMS EVIDENT PORTUGUESE WILL TO FIGHT IS SEEPING AWAY. WITH PROSPECT OF PEACE DANGLING IN FRONT OF THEM LIKE RIPE CARROT, YOUNG OFFICERS IN MOVEMENT OF ARMED FORCES (MFA) AND THE TROOPS THEY LEAD WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT AND PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE TO RE-MOBILIZE FIGHTING

SPIRIT NECESSARY TO RESUME DREARY COUNTER-GUERRILLA WAR. IT IS EVEN QUESTIONABLE AT THIS POINT WHETHER THEY WILL BE WILLING OR ABLE TO FIGHT SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE REAR GUARD ACTION TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO WHILE FRELIMO-PORTUGUESE NEGOTIATIONS GET UNDERWAY.

4. FRELIMO THUS HOLDS IMPORTANT BARGAINING CARDS AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO PLAY THEM FORCEFULLY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PORTUGUESE. MAIN QUESTION IS WHETHER INDEPENDENCE WILL BE ACHIEVED THROUGH PRIOR ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION SUCH AS REFERENDUM, OR WHETHER IT WILL BE GRANTED OUTRIGHT BY PORTUGAL. THIS IS HARDLY AN ISSUE WHICH WOULD INDUCE ARMED FORCES TO CONTINUE ALL-OUT WARFARE. PROSPECT OF CONTINUED FIGHTING, PLUS THREAT OF OUTBREAKS OF URBAN TERRORISM IN LOURENCO MARQUES AND OTHER CITIES, WOULD APPEAR TO BE SUFFICIENT TO FORCE THE PORTUGUESE TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. TO RETAIN ITS POSITION OF ADVANTAGE, FRELIMO HAS ONLY TO GIVE SOME ASSURANCES TO WHITE MINORITY AND TO AVOID EXCESSES WHICH MIGHT ROUSE ABHORRENCE OF PEOPLE WHO NOW SEEM PREPARED TO FORGIVE AND FORGET ITS PAST ACTIONS.

5. THERE IS STILL SOME QUESTION AS TO EXTENT OF FRELIMO'S SUPPORT AMONG MOZAMBICANS. MANY PORTUGUESE, INCLUDING SOME WHO OPPOSED PREVIOUS REGIME, BELIEVE FRELIMO IS NOT FAVORED BY MAJORITY OF MOZAMBICANS, AND THAT UNCERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER IT COULD WIN FREE ELECTION EXPLAINS WHY FRELIMO OPPOSES REFERENDUM.

6. IN ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS EXTENT OF FRELIMO'S SUPPORT WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE, FOLLOWING FACTORS ARE PERTINENT:

A) EVENTS IN LOURENCO MARQUES AND OTHER CITIES SEEM, FOR MOMENT AT LEAST, TO BE INCREASINGLY DICTATED BY
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 04 LOUREN 00422 01 OF 03 031829Z

SO-CALLED "DEMOCRATS OF MOZAMBIQUE" (DEMOCRATAS), RELATIVELY SMALL, VOCIFEROUS GROUP OF LEFTIST LAWYERS AND LONG-TERM OPPOSITIONISTS TO SALAZAR/CAETANO REGIMES, WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPORTING LABOR DEMANDS, ENCOURAGING STUDENT DISSENT, CALLING FOR WEEDING OUT OF "FASCISTS", AND TRYING TO CREATE AN IMAGE OF RESPECTABILITY FOR FRELIMO. SUPPORTERS OF THIS GROUP HAVE RECENTLY GAINED CONTROL OVER MOST NEWS MEDIA. MORE IMPORTANT, NEW MINISTER OF INTERTERRITORIAL COORDINATION, DE ALMEIDA SANTOS, AND NEW GOVERNOR GENERAL, SOARES DE MELO, ARE FORMER MEMBERS. DEMOCRATAS HAVE APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THAT FRELIMO IS BOUND TO CONTROL MOZAMBIQUE, THAT EVERYBODY SHOULD ACCEPT THIS AS FOREGONE CONCLUSION, AND THE SOONER THE TAKEOVER TAKES PLACE, THE LESS LIKELY TROUBLE CAN BE CAUSED BY THIRD FORCE OR TRIBAL OPPOSITION. THEY PROBABLY FORESEE PLACE FOR THEMSELVES IN NEW REGIME AS

ADVISORS AND POWERS BEHIND THE SCENE.

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PAGE 01 LOUREN 00422 02 OF 03 031928Z

67

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 LOURENCO MARQUES 0422

B) THERE IS CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION TO DEMOCRATAS AMONG WHITE PORTUGUESE IN THE BEIRA-VILA PERY- INHAMINGA REGIONS WHERE RECENT OUTBREAKS OF FRELIMO ACTIVITY HAVE GIVEN RISE TO CONSIDERABLE TENSION. MANY MEMBERS OF THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNITY OF LOURENCO MARQUES ARE ALSO BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISTURBED AND RESENTFUL OF DEMOCRATAS, WHO, THEY POINT OUT,

HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CITY-BOUND, HAVE RARELY HAD FIRSTHAND
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PAGE 02 LOUREN 00422 02 OF 03 031928Z

EXPERIENCE IN WAR ZONES, ARE POLITICALLY COMMITTED AND NAIVE, AND ARE SIMPLY LYING WHEN THEY CLAIM FRELIMO TO BE INNOCENT VICTIMS OF "FASCIST" PROPAGANDA WHO NEVER TOOK VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST AFRICAN POPULATION, BUT ONLY FOUGHT AGAINST PORTUGUESE MILITARY, ETC. NUMBER OF BUSINESSMEN WHO HAVE IN PAST CRITICIZED LISBON'S EXCHANGE REGULATIONS AND TIGHT CONTROLS OVER IMPORTS, ARE NOW FEARFUL THAT PRESENT LABOR DEMANDS FOR INCREASED WAGES WILL LEAD TO FURTHER DECLINE IN AN ALREADY MORIBUND ECONOMY.

C) WITH POLITICAL VIEWS STARTING TO BE MORE FREELY EXPRESSED, AND WITH BANDWAGON APPARENTLY ROLLING IN FRELIMO'S FAVOR, MANY LITERATE AFRICANS IN LOURENCO MARQUES, AND DOUBTLESS IN OTHER CITIES AS WELL, ARE BEGINNING TO JUMP ON. MANY OF THEM GENUINELY RESPECT FRELIMO AS SYMBOL OF OPPOSITION TO PORTUGUESE RULE BY VIRTUE OF ITS DETERMINED STRUGGLE OVER PAST ELEVEN YEARS. OTHERS MAY SIMPLY BE OPPORTUNISTS, BUT PRESENT IMPRESSION IS THAT, IN URBAN AREAS AT LEAST, FRELIMO WILL FIND OVERWHELMING SUPPORT AMONG THE AFRICANS.

D) ATTITUDE OF AFRICANS OUTSIDE OF THE CITIES IS NOT QUITE SO EVIDENT. PRESENT SUPPORT FOR FRELIMO AMONG MACONDES IN THE NORTH MAY DISAPPEAR ONCE FRELIMO ATTAINS POWER, AS MACONDES HAVE LONG TRADITION OF OPPOSITION TO DOMINATION BY OTHER PEOPLES. FRELIMO MAY ENJOY SUPPORT AMONG INHABITANTS OF THE SCANTILY POPULATED AREAS OVER WHICH IT HAS EXERCISED RELATIVELY BENIGN CONTROL. BY SAME TOKEN, PEOPLE WHO HAVE BORNE THE BRUNT OF FRELIMO PRESSURE TACTICS AND VIOLENCE MAY NOT BE SO FRIENDLY. ON BALANCE, AFRICANS TEND TO FOLLOW THE STRONG, AND THE MORE FIRMLY ENTRENCHED FRELIMO APPEARS TO BE, THE MORE WIDESPREAD ITS SUPPORT WILL BECOME.

E) OTHER ELEMENTS OF OPPOSITION TO FRELIMO CAN BE FOUND AMONG VARIOUS TRIBES WHO RESENT MONOPOLY ON FRELIMO LEADERSHIP EXERCISED BY CHANGANES. MACUAS, IN PARTICULAR, WHO COMPRISE LARGEST COLLECTION OF RELATED ETHNIC GROUPS IN MOZAMBIQUE, ESTIMATED BY SOME AS HIGH AS FOUR MILLION, HAVE REMAINED GENERALLY LOYAL TO PORTUGUESE AND HAVE RESISTED FRELIMO EFFORTS AT INFILTRATION. THE MOSLEM AJAUAS (YAO) IN NIASSA AND MOSLEMS ALONG NORTHEASTERN COAST ALSO
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 LOUREN 00422 02 OF 03 031928Z

TEND TO OPPOSE FRELIMO.

F) AFRICAN GRUPOS ESPECIAIS, FLECHAS, OTHER BLACK SOLDIERS WHO HAVE FOUGHT AGAINST FRELIMO, AND EX-FRELIMO SUR-RENDEREES, CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO BE HAPPY AT PROSPECT OF FRELIMO TAKEOVER.

G) ABOVE GROUPS WHICH OPPOSE FRELIMO ARE, HOWEVER, NOT ORGANIZED, AND DOUBTFUL THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TIME TO MOLD THEM INTO EFFECTIVE COUNTER-FORCE TO DISCIPLINED AND POLITICALLY DEDICATED FRELIMO CADRES.

7. WE CONCLUDE, THEREFORE, THAT DESPITE CONSIDERABLE APPREHENSION OVER FRELIMO INTENTIONS AND OPPOSITION TO FRELIMO BOTH AMONG AFRICAN AND PORTUGUESE WHITE POPULATIONS, FRELIMO HAS ENOUGH SUPPORT WHERE IT COUNTS, PLUS POLITICAL ACUMEN TO ENABLE IT TO GAIN CONTROL OF MOZAMBIQUE WHETHER REFERENDUM IS HELD OR NOT.

8. A FRELIMO-CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN INITIAL DEPARTURE OF LARGE PERCENTAGE OF WHITE PORTUGUESE POPULATION, INCLUDING MANY TEACHERS AND TECHNICIANS, WHOSE SKILLS COULD NOT EASILY BE REPLACED. ONE COULD EXPECT FRELIMO GOVERNMENT MORE OR LESS TO FOLLOW TANZANIA PATTERN OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM WITH NATIONALIZATION OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES, STRICT CONTROLS ON PRICE, WAGES AND LABOR DEMANDS--AFTER THOROUGHLY EXPLOITING THE LATTER AS MEANS OF WEAKENING PRESENT MANAGEMENT. UNLESS SOME AGREEMENT IS REACHED BETWEEN WHITES AND AFRICANS IN RHODESIA, ALL RELATIONS WITH RHODESIA WOULD PROBABLY BE BROKEN OFF AND ONE OF THE MAIN SANCTIONS BREAKING LOOPHOLES THUS CLOSED. RELATIONS WITH ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA WOULD BE STRENGTHENED, PERHAPS LEADING TO SOME TYPE OF ECONOMIC AND EVEN POLITICAL BLOC. FRELIMO GOVERNMENT WOULD OPPOSE SOUTH AFRICA POLITICALLY, PERHAPS EVEN SUPPORTING OR TACITLY ACQUIESCING IN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, BUT WOULD PROBABLY SEEK AT SAME TIME TO RETAIN ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA, AS WELL AS REVENUES FROM HANDLING SOUTH AFRICAN GOODS IN MOZAMBIQUE PORTS.

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PAGE 01 LOUREN 00422 03 OF 03 031929Z

67

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 LOURENCO MARQUES 0422

9. WHAT ARE IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY RESULTING FROM
FRELIMO ASSUMPTION OF POWER? FRELIMO LEADERS WOULD PROBABLY
START OFF WITH CERTAIN ANTI-AMERICAN BIAS, BASED ON THEIR
PROPAGANDA CLAIMS OF US MILITARY AID TO PORTUGAL AND GENERAL
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT DEVELOP
MEA CULPA COMPLEX OVER THIS; OUR POSITION OF STRICT NEU-
TRALITY IN FRELIMO-PORTUGUESE ARMED STRUGGLE, OUR REFUSAL
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 LOUREN 00422 03 OF 03 031929Z

TO GIVE MILITARY AID TO EITHER SIDE, OUR CONSTANT SUPPORT
FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR MOZAMBICAN PEOPLE, OUR SCHOLARSHIP
AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO EXILED MOZAMBICANS,
ARE ALL EVIDENCE OF AN HONORABLE AND PRAGMATIC POLICY.
FURTHER, THE FRELIMO LEADERS WHO START OUT IN CONTROL MAY
NOT LAST FOREVER. HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT LEADERS IN EXILE
RARELY RETAIN CONTROL FOR LONG WHEN THEY RETURN TO THEIR
COUNTRIES AFTER EXTENDED ABSENCE. MACHEL, DOS SANTOS, AND
COMPANY, WHO HAVE HAD LITTLE CONTACT WITH MAIN PORTIONS OF
MOZAMBIQUE FOR MANY YEARS, MAY FIND THAT THEY ARE NOT AS UP

TO DATE ON WHAT IS ACTUALLY GOING ON WITHIN MOZAMBIQUE AS, FOR EXAMPLE, FRELIMO GUERRILLA LEADERS WHO HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN FIGHTING WITHIN THE COUNTRY, OR AS POTENTIAL LEADERS WHO MAY YET EMERGE FROM OTHER POWER GROUPINGS SUCH AS ARMED BLACK SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT FOR PORTUGAL.

10. HENCE, WHILE GIRDING OUR LOINS FOR INITIAL HOSTILITY, WHICH HAS NOT YET STARTED BUT IS ALMOST BOUND TO COME IF PRESENT TREND IN PRESS IS ANY INDICATION, WE SHOULD MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME BY IMMEDIATELY BEEFING UP OUR REPRESENTATION AT POST IN PREPARATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FULL-FLEDGED DIPLOMATIC MISSION. WE SHOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO OUR INFORMATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS. WE SHOULD BEGIN TO EXPLORE WAYS OF EXTENDING AID--PARTICULARLY IN FIELDS OF EDUCATION AND ADMINISTRATION. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE INVESTMENTS TO HELP DEVELOP THE COUNTRY'S CONSIDERABLE MINERAL AND AGRICULTURAL RESOURCES. IN SHORT, OUR EFFORTS SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EQUAL TO THOSE WE MADE IN OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES OF COMPARABLE SIZE AND IMPORTANCE AT SIMILAR STAGES OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT.

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